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Introduction 
 
Research on born globals (BG) over the past two decades has primarily focused on 
the pace of internationalisation and factors contributing to the process of 
international involvement. The present article deviates from this focus and looks 
instead at the interacting roles of the board of directors, the investors and the 
founder(s) in this process.  It is believed that these actors play a decisive role in the 
development of the BG and that the risks involved make the case a special one.  
Through case studies we aim at exploring how these roles at BGs are being played in 
different phases of BGs.  
 
We have developed a conceptual model depicting how sales, profitability, and 
financing of BGs evolve over time. Inspired by Gabrielsson et al (2008) we have 
identified three distinct phases: pre-establishment/introduction, growth/maturity and 
break-out/independence.  The scope of the model ranges from the early stages of the 
founder(s)’ idea(s), through the stage of growth and maturity with invited venture 
capital investors, and ending on the stock exchange (IPO1), in a merger or with 
independence.  As the number of external investors increases, the founder(s)’ 
shareholding normally decreases, and his/her hold and influence on the company 
subsequently decreases. This typically has consequences for the composition of the 
board and for the direction of the BG development.  We posit that in the early stages 
of the company the board members usually consist of the entrepreneur(s), invited 
friends and specialists, and/or family members. As the company grows in size and 
obtains investments from e.g. venture capitalists (VC), the board may include 
professionals from the VC firm in addition to the founder(s). In the later stages of 
growth, the board often consists of professionals only, with the founder often 
remaining in top management.   
 
 
1 Initial Public Offering when the company issues common stock to the public for the first time 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of BG development 
 
The strategic development of a firm is often determined by the firm’s corporate 
governance framework. The board of directors (hereafter referred to as the “board”) 
is regarded as one of the major elements in the governance framework (Pearce and 
Zahra 1991). Previous research on the role of boards has tended to focus on large 
corporations. Since the 1990s, however, attention has shifted to include sporadic 
research relating to the role of the board in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) (cf. Huse 2000 for a review). BG companies can be viewed as a special type 
of SME (Gabrielsson et al. 2008) and board roles in these companies have not, to our 
knowledge, previously been investigated. Indeed it “is still considered that little work 
has been published in the area [of boards in SMEs] that has brought the field beyond 
the stage of infancy” (Huse 2000: 276). The article aims to address this gap in the 
literature in terms of BGs. 
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Previous research on BGs has primarily focused on the how and why of their rapid 
internationalisation process, and choice of entry modes (e.g. Jones and Coviello 
2005). This study departs from these earlier discussions and instead aims to address 
the question of what role the board of directors and the interacting relationships of 
the governance framework have in the strategic development of the BG.  In 
particular we explore potential tensions between the different stakeholders over the 
life cycle described in figure 1.  In particular we posit that tensions arising from 
different interests between the founder and professional investors make the BG 
particularly vulnerable to faulty processes within the board. 
 
The article is organised as follows: first a literature review is presented with a 
discussion of the BG phenomenon, followed by a review of research on boards of 
directors. We then describe the research design, followed by a description of four 
cases. Finally, the article discusses implications for research and management.  
 
Literature review 
 
This review includes two streams of literature: 1) on BGs and 2) on board of 
directors.  
 
Born globals 
The recent interest in BGs has led to a scrutiny of the available theoretical frameworks in 
order to explain the process of rapid internationalisation. BGs fall somewhat outside the 
traditional concept of an internationalising firm, the latter generally assuming that firms 
become international long after their formation. Traditionally internationalisation has 
been seen as a series of incremental commitment decisions depending on factors such as 
perception, expectation, experience, and managerial capacity as described in the so-
called Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 1990). In this way, uncertainty as 
well as risk is reduced over time for each country market. The firm is assumed to build a 
stable domestic position before starting international activities (Madsen, Rasmussen and 
Servais 2000). According to this model firms begin as non-exporters and evolve into 
experienced exporters in a sequential series of feedback loops. This model has received 
general support in the 1970 and 80’ies by a host of researchers (see for instance Bilkey 
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and Tesar 1977, Cavusgil 1983, Czinkota and Johnston 1983), particularly in the early 
stages of the process (Forsgren 1989, Solberg and Askeland 2006).   
 
In contrast, the BG firm is young and small, with rapidly increasing international sales. 
Thus, it is argued, the traditional theories fail to be applicable to the BG (McDougall et 
al, 1994; Aspelund et al, 2007). In 1988 Johanson and Mattson pointed out that some 
firms might follow other internationalisation patterns.  They argued, for example, that 
the degree of internationalisation of markets (i.e. the frequency, intensity, and integration 
of relationships across borders in the particular industry market) can impact the 
internationalisation process of the individual firm, resulting in a faster paced 
internationalisation process. Around the same time, Welch and Luostarinen (1988) 
discussed the concept of “leapfrogging” where they argued that factors such as the 
founder’s knowledge of export markets may allow the firm to “leapfrog” to markets far 
away, i.e. the learning process does not need to be gradual and several of the stages in 
the traditional Uppsala model can be skipped. 
 
Since the leapfrogging concept was introduced, new empirical studies of the export 
behaviour of firms have continued to challenge traditional stages models of firm 
internationalisation. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that many firms do not develop 
in incremental stages with respect to their internationalisation activities; rather they 
pursue marketing strategies that allow a much more erratic and faster paced 
internationalisation process. Bell (1995), for example, showed empirically that 
between 30 and 50% of small computer firms in Finland, Ireland, and Norway did 
not follow a stage model of internationalisation. Indeed many firms were observed to 
start international activities right from inception, and were seen for example to enter 
very distant markets right away, to enter multiple countries at once, and to form joint 
ventures without prior experience. Such firms have been labelled High Technology 
Start-ups (Jolly et al. 1992), International New Ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 
1994), Infant Multinationals, Global Start-ups and, more consistently, BGs (e.g. 
McKinsey & Co. 1993; Rennie 1993; Knight and Cavusgil 1996; Madsen and 
Servais 1997; Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2006; Gabrielsson et al. 2008). 
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Alternative theories concerning SME internationalisation and BGs have therefore 
been put forth, and the resource-based view (RBV) has emerged as one of the 
dominant frameworks (Autio 2005). The framework suggests that despite the lack of 
human and financial resources, early exporting firms have unique and superior 
resources that aid in rapid internationalisation. These include, but are not limited to, 
foreign work experience of top management, international networks, innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and a global vision resulting in a competitive advantage for the BG. 
Successful early exporters are high performing and innovative, and are highly likely 
to exploit chance opportunities that cross their path. In addition, the “global mind-
set” of the entrepreneur, draws the company in an international direction from its 
founding (Freeman and Cavusgil 2007). 
 
In addition to the RBV, most academic literature addressing the early exporting 
phenomenon mention international entrepreneurial orientation as being decisive 
factor for the establishment of this type of firm (Aspelund et al. 2007). Explanations 
for such an orientation may be based on psychological and cognitive processes or on 
experiential knowledge from previous international activities of the individual 
entrepreneur allowing him or her to interpret and react to signals and cues in global 
markets. It may also be the case that an entrepreneurial team as a group has 
international experience as well as industry and marketing experience which may 
lead to market knowledge, opportunity identification and network building that 
facilitates internationalisation (McDougall et al 2003). This may not simply be a 
result of the entrepreneurial team but may  also include the team of investors, board 
of directors and other stakeholders that have the global vision and experience 
necessary to push for rapid international expansion and/or export.   
 
From the above discussion, several factors can be identified to lead to a rapidly paced 
internationalisation process: the firm needs to have an international or global vision 
from inception, the product or service must be innovative and have global potential, 
and the organisation must be focused on international sales growth (e.g. Ganitsky 
1989; Jolly et al. 1992; McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994; Oviatt and McDougall 
1994).  In addition, in order to be classified a BG the company must have the 
independence of any mother company or large investor in the initial phases and risk 
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associated with start-ups.  We may conclude this section by stating that these two 
features (independence and risk) constitute the key challenge of the board of 
directors in BGs.  Little attention has however been given to the fate of BGs after its 
initial years of operation.  One exception is Gabrielsson et al (2008) who discuss a 
conceptual model of development of the BG.  They identify a number of challenges 
that have to be addressed, one of which is that of securing capital to build the 
necessary scale to compete in globalised markets (Solberg 1997).  With new capital 
and hence new investors, the issue of changes in the composition of the board 
emerges. 
 
Literature on board of directors 
Traditionally, general research on company boards has been dominated by relating 
board attributes (such as structures, processes, composition and characteristics) as the 
independent variables to company performance as the dependent variable (Zahra and 
Pierce 1989, Huse 2000).  Huse (2000) presented a model of processes inside and 
outside the boardroom being influenced by structural factors and board composition, 
working structures and task performance or board role.   The board role refers to 
what function the board has in terms of the company’s direction and performance.  
 
The literature on board roles has primarily drawn on agency theory, strategy 
literature and resource dependence theory (Huse and Zattoni 2008).  Agency theory 
suggests that boards – representing the capital owners (the principal) – should 
establish monitoring and control devices so as to curtail opportunism by management 
(the agent) and to realign goals of the two “camps” (Eisenhardt 1989a; e.g. Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Kosnik 1987). Conflicts may arise as for example management may 
have dissimilar interests from shareholders, the parties each having differing goals 
and differing attitudes towards risk. In addition information asymmetry and insight 
into the market and technological potential of the company may exacerbate different 
views on goals and risk. These factors – differing goals, different risk attitudes, and 
information asymmetry – may be paramount in the case of (high technology) BGs 
where performance ambiguity is particularly high and where often very different 
personalities – the entrepreneur and the investor - meet.   
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The strategy literature prescribes that the board take an advisory role, assisting the 
management team by guiding its operations (Andrews 1980).  This is thought to be 
particularly important for BGs as they may lack the necessary expertise and 
experience operating profitably in international markets.   For instance, government 
funding agencies (such as Innovation Norway in the country of the present research) 
often require external board members to be appointed in order to broaden the 
expertise of the firm, but also to avoid the risk of in-breeding and to introduce a 
disciplining element in the board room.  Castaldi and Wortman (1984) emphasize the 
complementing role of external directors, making comments or refining proposals 
made by management.  Finally resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salincik 
1978) implies the networking and legitimizing roles of the board.  For instance board 
directors can actively contribute to the successful operations of the BG by linking to 
relevant, previous network connections in international markets and legitimate the 
firm vis-à-vis its environment, such as government agencies, banks, suppliers or 
customers (Johannisson and Huse 2000, Solberg and Askeland 2006).   Describing 
the service role of the board, van den Heuvel et al. (2006) distinguish between the 
strategic role, the service role and the resource dependence role. The strategic role 
includes the board’s involvement in defining the firm’s business concept, mission 
and selecting and implementing company strategy. The service role includes advising 
the CEO and top management as well as initiating and formulating strategy. The 
resource dependence role concerns the acquisition of resources critical to the firm’s 
success. 
 
The present study is primarily concerned with interacting relationships in the 
governance framework, with a particular focus on the board of directors. The board 
and investors tend to be strongly interlinked as larger investors often request 
appointing board members. Agency theory lends itself particularly well to examining 
these interacting relationships as it is concerned with contracts (i.e. relationships) of 
conflicting interests as well as what happens when the parties involved have different 
perceptions of risk. In terms of the founder, top management, the board, the 
investors, etc. each party has different goals and desires connected to their role. What 
is particularly interesting is that agency relationships are context-specific, in the 
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sense that a given individual can shift from the role of principal to that of an agent 
across different contexts (Bergen et al. 1992:2).   
 
Of particular interest to this study is the discussion of which party at what given time 
takes on the role of principal or agent. Initially and most obviously, we believe the 
founder of the start-up has the role of principal – he/she has founded the company 
and delegates work to agents in order to build up the company in his/her vision. The 
initial board is appointed by the founder and its members act as agents. However, as 
the firm evolves and perhaps the role of the board becomes more formalized, the 
members may act as principals deciding for example on strategy with top 
management becoming the executing agents. Conflicts can arise as the founder of the 
BG, having deep insight into its technology and its potential, has a great belief in the 
company and is often willing to take great risks, personal and financial, in order to 
obtain the vision, whilst board members perhaps do not share this same perception 
and willingness of risk. Another conflict occurs when investors typically take a short 
to medium term view of their investment, pushing for growth and subsequent 
shareholder value, whilst the founder takes a more long term view of the potential 
ahead.  Some of these conflicts arise because of the inherent roles of the different 
actors.  However, the background of these players may also differ widely, hence the 
ideologies that govern their decisions are thought to be different and, therefore, 
create a potentially fertile soil for conflicts.  The new board members from venture 
capitalists characteristically represent what Johannisson and Huse (2000) term 
managerialism as opposed to the founder’s entrepreneurialism. 
 
As external investors arrive on the scene, these will likely take on the role of 
principal as the founder becomes fiscally dependent on the investor. Large, active 
investors often appoint board members and here again the board member 
representing the investor takes on the role of agent with the investor being the 
principal. In terms of these appointed board members, these are highly likely to take 
on the role of principal in relation to the founder. Indeed, the whole circle of 
interacting relationships shifts depending on the context, the goals and personal 
attitudes to risk, with individuals shifting from principal to agent and back to 
principal again. 
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Agency theory is perhaps most productive when it is used to examine conflict 
situations that are rife in business relationships. These include goal conflicts between 
a principal and its agents and situations of environmental uncertainty triggering the 
risk-sharing implications of the theory, and situations of information asymmetries 
whereby it is difficult to verify whether the agent follows the instructions of the 
principal (Bergen et al. 1992:19). These sources of conflict are apt to arise in the 
interacting relationships of the governance framework of the firm, and it is for this 
reason that agency theory has been used to examine board relationships and board 
processes.  Sapienza et al. (2000) discuss the effects of agency risk in boards of 
venture-capital backed firms. Outside board directors representing venture capitalists 
with considerable power are believed to have a particular incentive to be involved in 
the governance of the firm.  Here it is suggested that factors such as increase in 
perceived agency risks will increase outsiders’ tendency to focus efforts on 
monitoring and controlling board decisions, and to use formal means to resolve 
conflicts. They posit that fair procedures and interactions including participation and 
communication by all parties, through their effects on trust, will reduce these 
tendencies.  Trust is seen as an important control mechanism in establishing and 
sustaining cooperative exchange structures and networks (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 
1987, Solberg 2006) and has been divided into two types: resilient or affect-based 
and fragile or cognition-based (Ring 1996, McAllister 1995). We believe that BGs in 
their introductory and growth stages (Gabrielsson et al 2008) are particularly prone 
to conflicts that have been discussed above.  The roles of the board – controlling or 
servicing - may therefore have a paramount effect on the direction of these firms.  
We may infer from the above discussion that BGs with external board members 
(from venture capitalists) that actively communicate with management and the 
founder thereby nurturing trusting relationships hold greater chance of success than 
those where they impose their managerialism on the firm.   
 
Methodology 
 
In order to satisfy both the exploratory and qualitative criteria in terms of a research 
design, a case study approach is chosen. This approach involves a focus on a limited 
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number of cases during a limited time period in order to get an in-depth 
understanding of the processes at hand (Yin 2003). The aim is to develop new 
insights about the processes in the BG firm. The study is specifically concerned with 
how the perception of uncertainty and risk influences the role of the external 
stakeholders in their desire for control over strategic decision-making.  
 
The concept of uncertainty can be considered to have many dimensions. For the 
purpose of this study, two specific dimensions of uncertainty are chosen. These 
include the international dimension, as well as the dimension of the technological 
level of the industry the company is operating in. BG firms can be considered higher 
on the risk and uncertainty dimension, than nationally oriented firms. In addition, 
firms operating in high- and low-tech industries are compared, as high-tech 
industries can be considered more risk-laden as they depend more heavily on 
innovation and require a high degree of research and development (R&D) in the 
early phases of development as compared with low-tech industries. 
 
There is a continuum from the high-tech and aggressively born global, which is the 
one predicted to present the highest degree of uncertainty and risk for the involved 
stakeholders to the low tech and much less internationally oriented firm, predicted to 
present the “safest” option with the least uncertainty and risk for involved 
stakeholders. The aim of the research design is to understand the processes within the 
firm, particular in relation to how the board is used.  
 
Sampling 
This study uses theoretical sampling when selecting cases. When using several cases, 
Yin (2003) suggests either selecting cases so that they predict same results, or so that 
they give opposite results but for predictable reasons. This study uses the latter 
approach. We have chosen two cases from low tech industries Den Blinde Ku, in 
English: The Blind Cow AS, (artisanal cheese) and Voss Water ASA (premium 
artesian bottled water), the former (after a brief period of international sales) being 
far less exposed to global markets than the latter.  Two cases are drawn from hi-tech 
industries Nebb Engineering AS (engineering solutions and automation systems to 
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process and energy industry) and Scanweb 2 .  Nebb Engineering is indeed 
internationally oriented, but to a much less extent than Scanweb.   
 
Data collection 
Case studies handle multiple sources of information, and good case studies use as 
many sources as possible, including primary and secondary information (Yin 2003). 
This study uses for the most part in-depth structured interviews as the primary source 
of data, supplemented by secondary sources taken from newspapers, public company 
registers and other online media.  Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
key informants in the different firms.  Informants were chosen based on their 
background knowledge of the firm in question and their involvement in the strategic 
direction of the firm. In all cases informants were the founder, senior manager or 
board member. As far as possible, the researchers strived to conduct personal 
interviews with the informants, but in one case this was not possible and a telephone 
interview was conducted instead. 
 
The interviews were relatively structured in order to ascertain that all topics would be 
covered in all interviews; an approach recommended by Miles and Huberman 
(1994). Informants were, however, allowed to digress and expand on issues 
particularly pertinent to their particular case. Semi-structured interviews allow for 
guided, concentrated, focused and open-ended communication with interviewees 
(Crabtree and Miller 1992).  
 
Results 
This section presents an overview of each case.  
  
Den Blinde Ku AS (“The Blind Cow”)  
The Blind Cow was established in 1998 a year after the founder received a half-blind 
cow for her 50th birthday! Due to distribution regulations limiting sales to Norwegian 
supermarket chains, initial sales did not really take off and in order to survive they 
started exports in 2002 to France and the US (Manhattan speciality shops). A weak 
dollar in 2003, internal resource constraints (only 11 employees) and a concurrent 
 
2 Scanweb is a fictional name, as the company wanted to remain anonymous. 
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liberalisation of the Norwegian regulations led to a focus on the Norwegian market.  
Today exports have been abandoned.   
 
Initial investments were low and financial risks therefore also limited.  The founder 
had been running a successful horticultural farm, and had access to private savings.  
In addition her husband retained his day-job in order to ensure a steady family 
income. As sales increased, particularly as a result of export activity to France and 
the USA, there was a need to increase production capacity and new, external 
investors were needed.  As a consequence the founder invited new investors to take 
part in the expansion, 1,5 million NOK.  In addition to an initial start-up loan, 
Innovation Norway gave financial support in 2003 to a joint project with Tine, the 
largest dairy producer in Norway, aimed to create a “bridge of cheese” to France. 
The Blind Cow ended this collaboration in May 2006. In the years 2002-2005 
revenues were doubled each fiscal year, and the founder wished to focus exclusively 
on improving distribution of Blind Cow cheese. Later in 2006, a directed equity 
offering brought in a larger, external investor with 3 million NOK in fresh capital, 
but with no demand on board membership. Despite larger investments, the founder 
and her family – including her brother - have managed to retain ownership of 
approximately two thirds of the venture.  The strategy may be best qualified as 
“emerging strategy” (Mintzberg), having shifted from 100% exports in its initial 
phase, to no exports some six years later, from a strategic distribution alliance with 
the second largest cheese manufacturer in Norway to breaking up and establishing a 
franchise operation, with potential reengagement in export markets.  The company 
has now plans to bring in a new investor, a successful businessman with experience 
from retail industry in Norway.  He will also be an active board member.   
 
Management has been mostly in the hands of the family, first the founder herself, 
then during an interim period an external manager, to be replaced after three years by 
the founder’s daughter.  Since the start, the founder has been Chairman of the board. 
Today, additional board members include the former Managing Director (external), a 
former CEO of Tine, and the founder’s brother. Other board members have included 
the founder’s mentor at a leadership seminar hosted by Innovation Norway, and a 
few appointed board members over the years designated by external investors. 
Despite larger investments, the company is not producing positive fiscal results.  The 
founder has expressed that she would like someone else to be Chairman of the board, 
in order to but the challenge is finding someone who is as engaged in the company 
and believes in it as much as she does. “There have been some very hard times where 
I have worked around the clock and I don’t think that anyone external would have 
put as much effort into it as I have”.  
 
Table 1: Den Blinde Ku - Key issues 
  
 
 
In spite of poor financial records, no decisive criticism has been raised by other 
board members, and the role of the board in The Blind Cow has been rather that of 
rubberstamping. Although there is some expertise among the board members  - e.g. 
former Tine CEO has relevant industry-experience; the mentor from Innovation 
Norway has experience from operational management and strategy – this expertise 
has not really been voiced in the board room. The real decision-making power lies in 
family, with the founder as Chairman and her daughter as Managing Director. In 
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November 2007, the signatory was changed such that the Managing Director and the 
Chairman, i.e. the founder and her daughter, now have a co-joint signature in all 
cases – in essence sealing control of company actions. Although the board is an 
advisory agent whereby important issues are presented and discussed, the real 
decision-making power is retained in the founder’s family.  
 
Nebb Engineering AS  
Nebb was established in 1997 with the vision that they would deliver the best 
engineering solutions worldwide. Their initial focus was on software solutions within 
the Paper Machine Clothing (PMC) industry. The PMC industry manufactures felt 
and wire for paper mills as a paper mill will use felt and wire throughout their paper-
making process. Felts are large and complex; and an extreme repeatable and uniform 
quality is required. There is no PMC industry in Norway, and as a result Nebb began 
exporting its products right from inception. They have now branched out to include a 
variety of industries, some industries which also exist in Norway, including 
aluminium, energy, and petroleum.  
 
Initial investments required for the company’s founding were low. The company 
essentially began by offering consulting services within the engineering industry, 
delivering their first automation solutions to a former employer of the founder. Thus, 
with costs low and no initial large investments needed, there was little need for 
external investment in the company. In addition, the two co-founders had access to 
private savings. Innovation Norway has later contributed with financial support and 
advice to specific projects, for example when Nebb entered the Indian market in 
2006.  
 
Initially the family owned 90% of Nebb, with 10% distributed amongst the first 
employees. In 2006, 34% of Nebb was sold, in a combination of a public equity 
offering and shares, to the Swedish consulting and engineering firm FB Engineering 
AB.  
 
“In 2006, we sold part of Nebb to enable the company to pursue larger projects. We 
needed access to more resources if we wanted to be able to say yes to large 
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resource-demanding projects, such as building complete effluent-free gas power 
plants. In addition, we see it important that key employees are connected to the firm, 
and have therefore, over the years, offered such employees the opportunity to 
purchase shares” (founder).              
 
When Swedish FB Engineering bought 34% of Nebb, two representatives from the 
Swedish company were appointed on the board. These were to be the link between 
Nebb and FB Engineering such that larger projects could be undertaken. In addition, 
one of the board members was appointed as he has extensive experience from 
operations, in particular in the petroleum industry. In this sense the external 
representatives are mainly responsible for granting the board the role of providing 
access to additional resources that will help in the long-term strategic development of 
the venture.  
 
One of the co-founders is both Managing Director and Chairman of the board. The 
other co-founder is Department Manager as well as a member of the board. The other 
board members, apart from the external representatives, include an accountant and an 
employee representative. The processes involving the board have continuously 
evolved since the very beginning of the venture. Initially, the board was simply a 
legal necessity, used primarily for legal and accounting means. Over the years, 
however,  
 
“the board has definitely become much more professional. The primary objective 
now, is for the board to develop strategy and for management to carry out execution. 
[CEO duality] does not really pose a problem, as the roles of Chairman and 
Managing Director are so vastly different and clearly separated”. (co-founder) 
 
 
Table 3: Nebb Engineering AS - Key issues 
 
 
 
Indeed, the board now has a predominantly strategic role, in that it is responsible for 
deciding the long-term strategic direction of the firm, entries to markets, strategic 
alliances, and so on. Thus, as the company has developed, the role of the board has 
shifted from a formalised control role to that of a strong service role, particularly in 
the domains of deciding on strategy as well as providing access to resources through 
board members’ networks. 
 
 
Voss Water ASA 
Voss was established in 1998 with the vision of selling Norwegian bottled water to 
the American market and beyond. The company is a super-premium brand, selling 
bottled water to upmarket restaurants and hotels.  Today they are present in the USA, 
Europe and Asia, with only a negligible presence in the founders’ home country, 
Norway. Sales of Voss water began in the USA in 2000. First year turnover was 
around 5 million NOK; increasing to ca. 19 million NOK in 2001 (2.1 million US$) 
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and the company’s compound annual growth rate was over 82% between 2001 and 
2006.  Despite continuing increases in volume Voss has been plagued by severe 
financial losses. Reasons for this include challenges related to limits in production 
capacity and the devaluation of the US dollar currency, which has been steadily 
decreasing since 2001. Over the years, Voss has sustained substantial fiscal losses, 
and by 2008 the losses had increased to about 200 million NOK since its founding. 
 
To date, there have been a total of twelve investment rounds nine of which have been 
limited to family and friends. In 2004, 30% was sold to a US equity investor, but was 
bought back again in 2006. Today, ca. 80% of the company is owned by family and 
friends. The company still is in need of fresh capital, but has recently (May 2009) 
rejected a bid from an American investor willing to invest 175 million NOK, 
apparently in order not to dilute the shareholding of the controlling partners.  The last 
round was completed in Spring 2009, with the main shareholders pitching in fresh 
capital to secure continued operations.  The venture has from its very beginnings had 
a long-term investment horizon, with a commitment to grow the brand continuously. 
According one of the co-founders a long-term commitment is easier to achieve with 
family and friends as investors, as “they have an interest in that the company will 
succeed but have not exactly invested all their savings”. The founders’ share of Voss 
has decreased steadily over the years. Initially both founders owned 50%, but 
subsequent investment rounds have decreased this percentage. The main shareholder, 
a group of Norwegian private investors hold some 40%, the managing director holds 
20% and one of the co-founders holds an estimated 10%.   
 
“Professional investors demand a seat on the board, and appoint a board member of 
their choice. Family and friend-investors have merely demanded a professional 
board. The initial board was chosen in order to provide guidance to us founders, as 
we were young and inexperienced.” (co-founder). 
 
Initial investment rounds were limited to family and friends, and as quoted above, 
these demanded that the board be professional. Thus, the founders chose people who 
had an international outlook, international experience and experience from start-ups, 
and the first board Chairman was a director of the Confederation of Norwegian 
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Industries. Later a Norwegian lawyer with the bar exam from New York became 
Chairman. Board members have included top people from advertising and with 
experience from global start-ups. The Chairman (up to the Fall of 2008) is an active 
stakeholder, both as a shareholder and Chairman.  Board members are chosen based 
on competency. External, professional, investors in Voss appoint a board member for 
the duration of the investment relationship, in order to gain some form of control 
over boardroom proceedings as well as indirectly over management.  
 
“In the beginning, the board was very active, and we relied on their advice and 
competence for guidance. Today the board has a more passive role; I have daily 
contact with the Chairman, but the other [board members] have little influence on 
the daily running of the company” (co-founder). 
 
“The last couple of years the board’s role has been first and foremost to creatively 
identify new opportunities in the market when the market was with us – both 
concerning distribution and new products, then when things started to go sour to 
identify new investors. A bit of practical work in this context was done also by non 
executive board members” (former board member). 
 
The initial inexperience of the two founders led to a heavy reliance on the board for 
practical advice. Despite this it was the two founders who had the global vision of 
Voss from its very founding – they were always clear with regards to that Voss was a 
Norwegian company targeting the American and eventually global market. 
Throughout the history of the venture it has been the founders and top management 
who have largely decided on the strategic direction of the firm.  In the beginning, the 
board largely fulfilled a service role whereby the board advised top management and 
the CEO in providing guidance, experience-sharing and knowledge.  Later the role of 
the board has shifted – the Chairman is still very active in the day-to-day running of 
the venture and has taken on the role of mentor. The rest of the board, however, is 
now concerned with “bringing in funds and the financial side of the company, as well 
as rules and regulations”, thus having assumed a more passive role, however, still 
taking active part in the funding. The former Chairman was the only really active 
player on the board and in a sense seems to have replaced the need for a wholly 
active board team.   
 
One co-founder left management in 2001 and in 2006 the other one stepped down as 
CEO to head global marketing, branding, new products and US operations. Until the 
Fall of 2008 the group CEO had extensive experience from top positions in the 
European fast moving consumer goods industry.  He was then  replaced by the 
former Chairman of the board, who was replaced by an external individual (that may 
be described as a professional and an “enthusiast”).  
 
Table 5: Voss Water ASA – Key issues 
 
 
 
Voss Water was originally a dream brought to life by two founders that saw the 
opportunities in the high end mineral water market.  Their lack of experience in the 
industry, and hence also in relevant networks (particularly distribution networks) was 
sought alleviated by inviting professionals from the industry on the board.  One 
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challenge has been the inability to profitably operate in this market – particularly in 
the retail market.  The goal of the existing owners is to bring the company up to a 
financial standard where they will get a good price from potential bidders such as 
Nestlé, Schweppes, Louis Vuitton or other branders in the industry. 
 
“Scanweb” 
Scanweb was established in 1998 by a young entrepreneur – in his early 30’ies.  He 
had previously worked with a telecommunication company and brought with him 
ICT competence.  The business idea was to build a platform for registration of web 
domains, and to service these domains with a particular emphasis on SMEs.  Once a 
customer had established a domain with the assistance of the firm, it would have an 
ongoing customer relationship on a yearly subscription basis “for years to come”. 
The plan was extremely ambitious with a view to capture the European market 
within only a limited number of years, and thereafter “attack” the US market, 
potentially with a local partner.  This was deemed necessary in order to survive in the 
longer term, as there was a window of opportunity that would otherwise be lost.  
 
The founder brought with him into the venture friends and former colleagues, and the 
first couple of years they were less than ten employees working in the firm.  The 
development of the firm was thereafter exponential, as demonstrated by the capital 
expansions to follow the first year of foundation: 
 
1998  2 million USD (facilitated by a venture capital firm A) 
1999 6 million USD (facilitated by a venture capital firm A) 
2000 100 million USD (IPO organized by a venture capital firm, spread on a 
number of initial investors and then quoted at the Stock Exchange) 
2000 30 million USD (additional funding by a another venture capitalist - B) 
 
The founder and his friends had a majority of the shares (75%) in the first two 
rounds, and reduced this to a controlling minority (33%) in the third and fourth 
rounds.  It was important to the founder to wield control through network/friends 
whom he could trust.  
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The board was the three first years composed by the following persons: 
 
- Chairman, a friend of the founder, not directly employed by the firm (but 
with some shares) 
- Representative from the VC A 
- Representative from a leading law firm 
- An independent entrepreneur (just a few shares) 
- The founder himself 
 
Later the board was supplemented by a representative from VC B.   
 
The organisation consisted of the founder and his companions/former colleagues – 
few of whom had any particular experience in setting up a fast growing company or 
run it.   
 
The firm was at first very successful in attracting new customers, and the main 
product (the domain platform) seemed to satisfy the needs of the market.  With the 
new capital emission (130 million USD) the firm had indeed ample financial 
strength.  They used it to build an organisation of 150 people (from 10 to 150 over 8 
months) establishing sales and service subsidiaries in ten countries, and to advertise 
heavily on the web. 
 
In 2000-2001, when the whole venture was about to take off; they received between 
500 and 1.000 new customers per day!  It was important for the company to be able 
to boast a large number of customers, since its value – through the subscription 
system – basically lay in that very figure.  They had however a main problem in that 
the billing system and the organisation around it were not calibrated for such an 
influx of new customers.  The result was that they did not have a system at hand to 
follow up the billing, nor did they have personnel to do this.  This was so much the 
more critical as many of the new customers were recruited in countries where credit 
worthiness was difficult to ascertain (such as India, Pakistan, Ukraine). 
 
The limited management experience of the original team confronted with such an 
aggressive expansion plan became an insurmountable challenge.  Also the members 
of the board displayed their shortcomings: The VC representatives on the board were 
23 | P a g e  
 
mainly investors that were good at following up financial results, but did not have 
any experience in running businesses. The lawyer was a lawyer, and not a 
businessman, and the chairman – although knowledgeable within the field of activity, 
was mainly a friend in whom the founder could trust.  Therefore, it was primarily 
founder who was the leading force in the board room.  He was the one with the 
vision, with the technological knowledge, with the market insight.  The board – 
during the first years of operations did not really wield any power/will concerning 
the business as such.   
 
Compounding these internal deficiencies, in 2001 the dot com bubble burst and the 
shares fell dramatically in value.  This was of course a main concern of the external 
investors, and thus of their representatives on the board.  But the share price not only 
reflected the bubble, but also the fact that invoices at an increasing rate were not 
honoured, partly because of the flawed billing system.  At one point the board 
decided to bring an external consultant, at an exorbitant cost, seemingly without any 
positive result!  The independent entrepreneur at the board was changed for a person 
(also that an independent entrepreneur) who had a network in the US, also that 
without any visible positive results.   
 
The impression is that the board – without the necessary clout or competence started 
to panic when things went wrong.  They had board meetings every second week, and 
oftentimes these meetings did not follow any specific agenda.  The discussion in the 
board room was mainly about “how can we save our money” rather than “how can 
we secure a proper development of our business”.  The founder was heavily involved 
in these board meetings, deviating his attention from his main task: to lead the 
company build up into world markets.  The chairman of the board quit in the 
beginning of 2001 and a new chairman recruited from the ICT industry was engaged, 
apparently without much success! The founder later quit the company in 2001, but 
had still clout with the board members and was occasionally used as a consultant to 
the board.   
 
“The board really did not care about the business as such.  They did not have any 
insight and did not really understand the business logics.  They only wanted return 
on investment!” (former manager).   
 
The company was eventually sold to a Benelux firm at a “reduced price”, and this 
company in turn split it up, and then again brought to the stock exchange, only to be 
bought up some years later by a large 
 
Table 5: Scanweb– Key issues 
 
 
 
We may conclude that the board of directors did not have satisfactory knowledge 
about the business model of the firm, and as such did not show any interest in the 
heart of the business; rather they were obsessed by the lack of return when things 
went wrong.  The founder was therefore pulled into the board room at much too 
frequent intervals and his attention was thereby taken away from his main task: build 
a company.  He was still able to maintain his credibility – as he really was the only 
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one on the board that had a full understanding of the business logic.  One could say 
that because of information  (and knowledge) asymmetry he could hold on to his 
position, in spite of the fact that he probably was not the man to lead the build-up of 
a large organisation.   
 
Also, the incredible amount of money that was “poured into” the company blinded 
management and made them less critical of the spending plan.  They engaged in a 
number of markets without having control of costs and results.  Eventually they 
disinvested in five of the ten markets after only a short period of time – less than a 
year.  
 
Discussion 
 
The initial assumption at the start of this study (that potential tensions between 
external investors such as private equity firms or venture capitalists and the founders 
of the firm because of agency problems) was not supported.  This is particularly the 
case with Den Blinde Ku, Nebb but also to some extent Voss and Scanweb.  The 
founder and his/her close allies had controlling financial positions in their firms and 
they will therefore find themselves at both sides of the table, making archetypal 
agency theory issues less applicable in the four firms.   The behaviour of boards in 
the firms that have consistently endured continuous losses over several years, Den 
Blinde Ku, Voss Water, and Scanweb also warrants a comment.   In these cases the 
two former seem to alleviate potential conflicts through trusting relationships with its 
investors / board members (Sapienza et al 2000), whereas in the latter case, the board 
consists of external professionals representing investors without any in depth insight 
into the business model of the firm.   
 
On the other hand, the vulnerability of start ups and different aspects of the 
relationship between the board/investors and the founder has been uncovered.  The 
four companies have followed highly diverse trajectories in their development in 
international markets.  They are in different stages and have grappled with vastly 
different challenges.  One of the high tech companies exhibit the best financial 
outcomes so far and has grown steadily over the years, the other one showing an 
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extremely rapid growth, and – probably as a consequence – was at one point in deep 
trouble.  One of the reasons for that was not only the growth as such, but allegedly 
also the inability of management/the board to do something about it.  The two low 
tech companies struggle with continuing losses since their establishment.  In other 
words, the supposed uncertainties linked to introduction of high technology products 
do not necessarily translate into a more uncertain future for the firms.  Rather it 
seems as though other factors, such as for instance experience and networks in the 
industry – as illustrated in the case of Nebb, weigh more heavily in the equation.  
Also, the low tech firms enter markets with products that essentially compete more 
or less directly with well established brands and with well established marketing 
channels making the market introduction a highly risky venture.  Conversely, hi-tech 
firms bring something new to the market, “filling a gap”.   
 
Despite these different situations – parallels exist between the case companies and 
the way in which their board of directors are composed and operate.  It is in fact 
mostly the founders and their friends and families that hold majority stakes - in three 
of the four firms even after ten years of operation, including for two of them 
financially difficult times.  As stated by one of the interviewees, founders and their 
family and friends are more patient.  This may be one important reason why the 
boards still take on at best a service oriented and sometimes a passive role rather than 
a controlling function inspired by agency theory.  Even though there may be conflicts 
in board meetings when budgets are decided and poor financial results are 
“swallowed”, such conflicts do seemingly not sway the original strategies laid out by 
the founders.  The question then remains for how long the losses should be allowed 
to persist – in the three loss making firms this period has lasted between five and ten 
years.  In one case (Scanweb) the firm was taken over by new owners who totally 
restructured the whole firm. 
 
Another similarity between the firms is the strong position of the founders often with 
the help of  their closest allies.  In spite of the poor financial results in three of the 
firms, the investors and their representatives on the board still held on to the founder, 
possibly because they were to various degrees dependent on him/her.  It is telling that 
the general assembly of one of the most “prominent losers” (Voss)  rejected a new 
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investor at a period when they were in great need of new funding.  Instead they 
provided the necessary funding to continue the operations.  In most of the cases the 
role of the board was initially that of a service role or even a passive, 
“rubberstamping” role, then gradually becoming more control oriented as financial 
stakes and losses increased, and as new and external directors came on board.   
 
There are also some noticeable differences.  For instance the board of directors of the 
loss-making Voss Water has been subject to continuous changes, with external (to 
the inner circle of family and friends) investors playing a more active role than the 
board of the other firms.  We also observe – not surprisingly - that heavy losses 
(Voss Water) lead to a more controlling board, both in terms of following up budgets 
and in terms of securing future funding.  In Scanweb’s case the board met 
“incessantly” – every two weeks – over a long period of time, squabbling about what 
actions to take and what strategies to follow, taking a controlling stance allegedly 
doing more wrong than right.  This seems not to be the case of the third loss-making 
firm (Den Blinde Ku) where the losses are far less consequential.  In this case the 
board’s role is much more withdrawn, the founder being the strongwoman, partly 
because she is the main shareholder, partly because she is so proactively involved in 
the business, and partly also because no one else is ready to take on the job as 
executive chairperson on the conditions offered (virtually no fee/ salary).  In the case 
of Nebb, the only profit maker among our case companies, the board has been 
strengthened with representatives from a strategic partner, in order to reinforce its 
position in certain market segments, in other words mainly a service and network 
facilitating role. 
 
Based on our findings we posit a number of propositions that we deem should be 
explored further in a broader context through surveys. 
 
P1 
a) Boards of fast growing BGs need relevant industry competence and network in 
order to properly assist the firm in its market deployment.   
b) Boards without such competence tend to take the role as controllers rather than 
service providers to the firm.  
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c) A powerful founder (in terms of capital and/or industry competence) in such firms 
needs a competent board to discuss and contrast his / her ideas in order for the firm to 
develop a viable long term strategy. 
 
P2 
Investor groups such as friends and former business partners are more patient than 
private equity firms and venture capitalists and are willing to endure higher losses for 
a longer period of time than professional investors.   
 
P3 
The more trust in the founder, and the more reliant the investor is on the founder’s 
expertise the more patient the investor.  This may in the longer run create agency 
problems that are not apparent in the first stages of the BG life cycle (Gabrielsson et 
al 2008). 
 
P4 
Firms with patient investors are prone to expand more slowly than firms with 
impatient investors.   
 
P5  
Firms expanding rapidly in international markets will more frequently meet 
unforeseen challenges and will therefore also have more tensions in the board room 
than firms that expand less rapidly. 
 
P6  
BGs with high tensions in the board room tend to fare less successfully in 
international markets than firms without such tensions.   
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Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to uncover critical issues concerning the 
relationships between investors, board members and founders of BGs.  In spite of the 
fact that boards of directors play a decisive role in the development of firm strategies, 
this aspect of BG management has largely been neglected in the literature.  Since the 
demands placed upon this class of firms often are greater than on firms that develop 
their international sales more gradually (McDougall and Oviatt 1994, Knight and 
Cavusgil 1996, Madsen et al 2000) the main assumption has been that agency 
problems will create an atmosphere of tension between the relevant stakeholders 
(investors, founders, board members), and hence also lead to strategic decisions that 
sometimes are less than desirable.  Through interviews and secondary data we have 
sought information that is difficult to access and therefore we may have failed to 
uncover the real tensions inside the board room, and their consequences on BG 
strategic decisions.   
 
However some tentative conclusions emerge: 1. Potential conflicts are much more 
rife in fast growing BGs with external investors (Scanweb); 2. Family and friends of 
the founder tend to stay put much longer than anticipated and therefore extend the 
period of “patient capital” in the firm (Voss Water and Den Blinde Ku); 3. Although 
agency problems exist they do so with much less prevalence than in “ordinary firms” 
since the founder normally finds him/herself on both sides of the table (principal and 
agent); 4. Competence in the boardroom, not only about business operations in 
general, but also about the business logic of the industry in which the BG operates is 
critical for propitious development of the firm.  Or conversely: board members 
without concrete knowledge of / experience from the business of the BG firm are 
prone to play a lesser role in the strategic decision making process, placing more 
emphasis on the control role (than on the service role) of the board.   
 
It is difficult to “get under the skin” of board room deliberations, and therefore – 
even though we have been able to interview key people (either the founders or 
representatives of the board and management), critical aspects of the phenomenon 
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under study may not have been sufficiently uncovered. Possibly the best way to 
delve deeply into these issues is to participate in the board room either as an 
observer, or as an active member of the board (Huse and Zattoni 2008).  If this is the 
best way, it is also a very difficult way of accessing information because of 
confidentiality issues.  Nevertheless, more research is needed to uncover the role of 
the board in BGs both through more case studies to explore these issues further and 
through surveys to be able to possibly identify a broader picture.   
 
 
31 | P a g e  
 
References  
Aspelund, A., T.K. Madsen, and Ø. Moen. 2007. “A review of the foundation, 
international marketing strategies, and performance of international new ventures.” 
European Journal of Marketing, 41(11-12): 1423-1448. 
 
Autio, E. 2005. “Creative tension: the significance of Ben Oviatt’s and Patricia 
McDougall’s article “Toward a theory of international new ventures”.” Journal of 
International Business Studies, 36(1): 9.19. 
 
Bell, J., R. McNaughton, and S. Young. 2001. “Born again global” firms: An 
extension to the “born global” phenomenon.” Journal of International Management, 
7(3): 173-189. 
 
Bell, J., R. McNaughton, S. Young, and D. Crick. 2003. “Towards an integrative 
model of small firm internationalization.” Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 
1(4): 339-62. 
 
Bergen, M., S. Dutta and O.C. Walker (Jr.). 1992. “Agency Relationships in 
Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related 
Theories.” Journal of Marketing, 56(3): 1-24. 
 
Bilkey, W.J. and G. Tesar. 1977. “The Export Behaviour of Smaller Wisconsin 
Manufacturing Firms.” Journal of International Business Studies, 9: Spring/Summer. 
 
Borch, O.J. and M. Huse. 1993. “Informal Strategic Networks and the Board of 
Directors.” Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 18: 23-36. 
 
Cavusgil, S.T. 1980. “On the Internationalization Process of Firms.” European 
Research, 8(Nov): 273-281. 
 
Cavusgil, S.T. 1994. “A quiet revolution in Australian exporters.” Marketing News, 
28(11): 18-21. 
 
Crabtree, B.F. and W.L. Miller (Eds.). 1992. Doing qualitative research. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989a. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” 
Academy of Management Review, 14(1): 57-74. 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989b. “Building Theory from Case Study Research.” 
Academy of Management Review, 14(4): 532-50. 
 
Fama, E. and M. Jensen. 1983. “Separation of ownership and control.” Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26: 301-325. 
 
Freeman, S. and S.T. Cavusgil. 2007. “Toward a Typology of Commitment States 
among Managers of Born-Global Firms: A Study of Accelerated Internationalization. 
Journal of International Marketing, 15(4): 1-40.  
32 | P a g e  
 
 
Fried, V.H., G.D. Bruton and R.D. Hisrich. 1998. “Strategy and the Board of 
Directors in Venture Capital-backed Firms.” Journal of Business Venturing, 1:493-
503. 
 
Gabrielsson, J. and M. Huse. 2002. The venture capitalist and the  board of directors 
in SMEs: roles and processes. Ventre Capital, Vol 4, No 2, 125-146. 
 
Gabrielsson, M., V.H.M. Kirpalani, P. Dimitratos, C.A. Solberg, and A. Zucchella. 
2008. “Born globals: Propositions to help advance theory.” International Business 
Review, 17(4): 385-401. 
 
Ganitsky, J. 1989. “Strategies for innate and adoptive exporters: Lessons from 
Israel’s case.” International Marketing Review, 6(5): 50-65.  
  
Huse, M. 2000. “Boards of directors in SMEs: a review and research agenda.” 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12: 271-290. 
 
Huse, M. and A. Zattoni. 2008. Trust, Firm life cycle, and actual board behavior: 
evidence from “one of the lads” in the board of three small firms, International 
Studies of Mangement and Organization, Fall 2008, Vol. 38 Issue 3, 71-97. 
 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360. 
 
Johannisson, B. and M. Huse. 2000. “Recruiting Outside Board Members in the 
Small Family Business: An Ideological Challenge.” Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development, 12: 353-378. 
 
Johanson, J. and L.G. Mattson. 1988. “Internationalisation in Industrial Systems – A 
Network Approach.” In Strategies in Global Competition, edited by N. Hood and 
J.E. Vahlne. New York: Croom Helm. 
 
Johanson, J. and J.E. Vahlne. 1977. “The Internationalisation Process of the Firm: A 
Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Commitments.” Journal 
of International Business Studies, 8(2): 23-32. 
 
Johanson, J. and J.E. Vahlne. 1990. “The mechanism of internationalization.” 
International Marketing Review, 7(4): 11-24.  
 
Johnson, J.L. C.M. Daily and A.E. Ellstrand. 1996. “Boards of directors: a review 
and research agenda.” Journal of Management, 22: 409-438. 
 
Jolly, V.K., M. Alahuta and J.P. Jeannet. 1992. “Challenging the incumbents: How 
high technology Start-ups compete globally.” Journal of Strategic Change, 1: 71-82. 
 
Jones, M.V. and N.E. Coviello. 2005. “Internationalisation: Conceptualising an 
entrepreneurial process of behaviour in time.” Journal of International Business 
Studies, 36: 284-303. 
 
33 | P a g e  
 
Karlsen, S.M.F. 2007. “The Born Global – Redefined. On the Determinants of SMEs 
Pace of Internationalization.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Marketing, 
Norway: BI Norwegian School of Management. 
 
Knight, G. 1997. “Emerging Paradigm for International Marketing: the Born Global 
Firm.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Marketing and Supply Chain 
Management, USA: Michigan State University. 
 
Knight, G. and S. T. Cavusgil. 1996. ”The Born Global Firm: A Challenge to 
Traditional Internationalization Theory.” Advances in International Marketing, 
Greenwich, 8: 11-26. 
 
Kosnik, R. 1987. “Greenmail: A study in board performance in corporate 
governance.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 163-185. 
 
Larimo, J. 2007. “Different types of Exporting SMEs: Similarities and Differences in 
Export Performance.” Advances in International Marketing, 17: 17-62. 
 
Luostarinen, R. and M. Gabrielsson. 2006. “Globalization and Marketing Strategies 
of Born Globals in SMOPECs.” Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(6): 
773-801. 
 
Madsen, T.K., E. Rasmussen and P. Servais. 2000. “Differences and Similarities 
Between Born Globals and Other Types of Exporters.” Advances in International 
Marketing, 10: 247-265.  
 
Madsen, T.K. and P. Servais. 1997. “The Internationalization of born globals: an 
evolutionary process?” International Business Review, 6(6): 561-83. 
 
McDougall, P.P., S. Shane, and B.M. Oviatt. 1994. “Explaining the Formation of 
International New Ventures.” Journal of Business Venturing, 9: 469-487. 
 
McDougall, P.P., B.M. Oviatt and R.C. Shrader. 2003. “A Comparison of 
International and Domestic New Ventures.” Journal of International 
Entrepreneurship, 1(1): 59-82. 
 
McKinsey & Company. 1993. “Emerging Exporters: Australia’s High Value-Added 
Manufacturing Exporters.” Melbourne: McKinsey and Co. and Australian 
Manufacturing Council. 
 
Miles, M.B. and M.A. Huberman. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
 
OECD Report. 1997. “Global Information Infrastructure – Global Information 
Society: Policy Recommendations for Action.” Paris: OECD. 
 
Oviatt, B.M. and P.P. McDougall. 1994. “Towards a theory of international new 
ventures.” Journal of International Business Studies, 25(1): 45-64. 
 
34 | P a g e  
 
Pearce, J.A. and S.A. Zahra. 1991. “The relative power of CEOs and boards of 
directors: associations with corporate performance.” Strategic Management Journal, 
12: 135-153. 
 
Pearce, J.A. and S.A. Zahra. 1992. Board composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, Vol 24, No 4, July, 411-431. 
 
Rasmussen, E.S. and T.K. Madsen. 2002. “The Born Global Concept.” Paper for the 
28th EIBA Conference in the special session “SME internationalisation and born 
globals – different European views and evidence”. Athens, Greece, University of 
Southern Denmark, Department of Marketing. 
 
Rennie. M.W. 1993. “Global competitiveness: Born global.” McKinsey Quarterly, 4: 
45-52. 
 
Rialp, A., J. Rialp and G.A. Knight. 2005. “The phenomenon of early 
internationalizing firms: what do we know after a decade (1993-2003) of scientific 
enquiry?” International Business Review, 14(2): 147-66. 
 
Rubin, I. and H. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data. 
California: Sage Publications. 
 
Sapienza, H.J., M.A. Korsgaard, P. Goulet and J.P. Hoogendam. 2000. “Effects of 
agency risks and procedural justice on board processes in venture capital-backed 
firms.” Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12: 331-351. 
 
Servais, P., T.K. Madsen and E.S. Rasmussen. 2007. “Small Manufacturing Firms’ 
Involvement in International E-Business Activities.” Advances in International 
Marketing, 17: 297-317. 
  
Solberg, C.A. 2007. "Born Global Panel." Presented at the 33rd EIBA Conference, 
Catania, Italy.  
 
Solberg, C.A., T. Sundal and K. Thoresen. 2008. "High tech and low tech Born 
Globals. Are they any different?" Presented at the 34th EIBA Conference, Tallin, 
Estonia. 
 
Van den Heuvel, Jeroen; Anita Van Gils and Wim Voordeckers. 2006. “Board Roles 
in Small and Medium-Sized Family Businesses: performance and importance.” 
Corporate Governance, 14(5): 467-485 
 
Welch, L.S. and R.K. Luostarinen. 1988. “Internationalization: Evolution of a 
Concept.” Journal of General Management, 14(2): 36-64. 
 
Welch, D., L. Welch, L.C. Young, and I.F. Wilkinson. 1998. “The importance of 
networks in export promotion: Policy issues.” Journal of International Marketing, 
6(4): 66-82. 
 
Yin, R.K. 2003. Case Study Research – Design and Methods. 3rd ed. California: Sage 
Publications. 
35 | P a g e  
 
 
Zahra, S.A. and J.A. Pearce. 1989. “Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model.” Journal of Management, 15: 291-
334. 
 
